登录
中文
cover

区块链治理提案(翻译)

本文内容已上传星际文件存储系统「IPFS」,永久保存,不可删除。

ipfs

原文链接:https://medium.com/@bytemaster/blockchain-governance-proposal-470478e42686

作者:Daniel Larimer

发表时间:2019-10-15

翻译&注释:Ponge,百度翻译

区块链治理的目的是维护尽可能多数人的最佳利益下进行决策,同时尽量减少一小部分人以牺牲社区利益的方式行事的可能性。区块链治理的关键是要协调利益选出如果网络无法发挥其潜力时损失最大的一方。真正的股权证明(PoS)要与长期利益一致,并将控制权交给那些有长期承诺的人。

The purpose of blockchain governance is to make decisions in the best interest of as many people as possible while minimizing the opportunity for a small group of people to act in ways that benefit themselves at the expense of the community. The key is to align interests and select the parties with the most to lose if the network fails to operate to its potential. True proof of stake aligns long term interests and puts control in the hands of those with a long term commitment.

从可以客观证明的角度,我们可以保守地假设投票给区块生产者(BP)的所有账户都归区块生产者(BP)所有。我们也可以将投票和“买票”看作是区块生产者(BP)为了获得前N名资格进行的“租用股份”行为。由于(BP)租借(股份)和卖出一份免信任的(trustless)回购协议 [1] 两者没有什么区别,因此“买票”(译者注:或者贬义地,“贿选”)没有任何不道德之处,试图阻止这项活动实际上是对所有权的潜在侵犯。

From the perspective of what can be proven objectively, we can conservatively assume all accounts which vote for a producer are owned by the producer. We can also view votes and “vote buying” as nothing short of “renting stake” for the purpose of qualifying for the top N. Since there is little difference between renting and selling with a trustless repurchase agreement, there is nothing immoral with this activity and attempts to prevent it are in fact a potential violation of ownership rights.

为了确保长期前景和“利益一致” [2],只有锁定在长期质押合约中的通证才有资格投票。人们因质押获得的收益是其流动性损失的补偿,并且收益应与通证被锁定的时间长度成正比。通证(基于市场决定的利率)被锁定时间尽可能的长,对于通证网络来说是最好的。

To ensure a long-term outlook and “skin in the game”, only tokens locked in a long-term staking contract qualify for voting. The yield someone earns for staking compensates them for the loss of liquidity and should be proportional to the length of time the tokens are locked up. It is best for the network for tokens to be locked as long as possible based upon market determined rates of interest.

20191015区块链治理提案(翻译).png

因此,我提议创设6个质押池:3个月、6个月、12个月、2年、5年和10年。在通证供应量为10亿的网络中,每个池每年将以分钟为单位,累计收到500万个通证(假设网络运行100%可靠)。用户可以将通证投入质押池,根据占质押池的比例获得该池的收入。用户的投票权重则是基于每个质押池占比的加总。这意味着网络存在3%的年通胀率,通胀部分支付给不同的质押池。

Therefore, I propose the creation of 6 staking pools: 3 month, 6 month, 12 month, 2 year, 5 year, and 10 year. In a network with a token supply of 1B, each pool will receive 5M tokens per year on a minute by minute basis (assuming network is operating at 100% reliability). Users can buy into the pool to receive their pro-rata share of that pools income. A user’s vote-weight is based upon the sum of their percentage ownership of each pool. This represents a 3% annual inflation paid to the different staking pools.

质押部分在全周期上至多按周为单位释放,流通部分可以赎回 [3]。 比如,质押在3个月质押池中的通证每周可以释放约7%,质押在10年质押池中的通证每周可以释放0.2% [4]。

Funds can be withdrawn from the pool at most one a week. Stake in a 3 month pool could be withdrawn at about 7% per week. Stake in a 10 year pool could be withdrawn at 0.2% per week.

质押池中的通证会从“资源”池中剔除,因此这部分不能借给资源交易所(REX),这会增加REX中所有通证的单位带宽。质押池可以被看作债券 [5], 同时该部分通证会退出流通市场,并在未来某个时候恢复流通,同时获得通胀带来的利息。

Tokens in a stake pool are taken out of the “resource” pool so cannot be lent to the REX, this increases the bandwidth per token for all tokens in the REX. The staking pools can be viewed as a bond where the tokens are taken out of circulation now and returned to circulation with added interest from inflation at some point in the future.

只要你的通证仍然在一个质押池,这些通证就可以获取利息,利息等于每一个质押池的通证奖励乘以用户在该池的通证占该质押池质押总量的比例 [6]。

So long as your tokens remain in a staking pool they will have their interest compound at a rate proportional to the total amount of stake in each pool.

通证可以从短期质押池转移到长期质押池,不会有任何延迟。 因此,你可以在任何时候将3个月质押池中的通证100%转移到10年质押池中;但是,你不能从10年质押池转移到较短期限的质押池,每周解禁的0.2%除外。

Tokens can move from a shorter term to a longer term without any delay. So you can move 100% of your 3 month stake to a 10 year stake at any time; however, you cannot move from a 10 year to a shorter term except at the rate of 0.2% per week.

这种质押系统的结果是,市场的力量将会基于权力渴望和流动性的权衡构造收益率曲线。 很少有人愿意放弃10年的流动性,所以他们将获得更高的相对收益,并在网络中拥有更大的权力。更多的人愿意放弃3个月的流动性,因此他们将获得更低的收益和更少的权力。

The outcome of this staking system is that market forces will set the yield curve based upon balancing the desire for power and liquidity. Few people will want to give up liquidity for 10 years so they will earn a higher relative yield and more power over the network. More people will be willing to give up liquidity for 3 months, so they will get a lower yield and less power.

一旦每个人都进行了抵押和投票,21个区块生产者(BP)将在“一票一投”的基础上被选中(投票权重按通证质押在各个质押池的比例加权)。这些区块生产者(BP)将按他们获得的选票比例获得奖励,而不是以出块作为基础。向区块生产者(BP)支付与它们选票呈线性关系以外的额外部分,将鼓励女巫攻击 [7]。这将导致权力愈发中心化,而不是不同的21方。当一个人试图控制两个或多个节点时,事实上整个网络只有20个或更少的节点。

Once everyone has staked and voted, 21 block producers will be selected on a “one token one vote” basis (weighted by percent of pool tokens are staked in). These producers will be paid proportionally to the votes they receive instead of on a per-block basis. Paying block producers anything other than a linear relationship to their votes will incentives a sybil attack and result in increased centralization of power instead of 21 distinct parties, there may only be 20 or less with one person attempting to control two or more slots.

区块生产者(BP)的奖励应减少到每年仅占通证供应量的0.5%(按全球可靠性贴现)。最终,最大的利益相关者可能会控制哪些是区块生产者(BP);因此,质押池的收益可能会和出块奖励流向同一批人——运行BP的人。

Producer rewards should be minimized to just 0.5% of token supply per year (discounted by global reliability). Ultimately, the largest stakeholders will likely control who the producers are; therefore, the yield paid to the staking pools is likely flowing to most of the same people who are running the producers.

如果网络不能确保可靠地生产区块,世界上所有的去中心化项目对任何人都没有帮助;因此,整个网络的通胀率需要加上一个系数,系数等于7日平均可用性(7-day average availability)的10次方。如果7DAA=99%,整个网络的通胀率为最大膨胀率3.5%的90%(译者注:0.99^10^≈0.9044)。如果一个区块生产者(BP)开始丢块,可靠性下降到97%,那么每个人的收益率降到最大收益率的73%(译者注:0.97^10^≈0.7374)。这意味着,如果选民(质押者)不投票给可靠的区块生产者(BP),他们将受到惩罚。

All the decentralization in the world helps no one if the network cannot ensure that blocks are produced reliably; therefore, all inflation is scaled by the 7 day average availability raised to the 10th power. At 99% reliability the total inflation will be 90% of the max inflation of 3.5%. If a producer starts missing blocks and reliability falls to 97% then everyone’s yield falls to 73% of maximum yield. This means that voters (stakers) are punished if they don’t vote for reliable producers.

预期成果 Expected Outcome

交易所将无法使用用户通证进行投票,因为大部分控制权都与长期的质押合约有关。采用一票一投模式,按票数比例支付奖励,将结束两个区块生产者(BP)由一个人经营的局面。采用质押通证才能投票的方式,我们可以保证每个想成为区块生产者(BP)的人和网络“利益一致”,也可以保证即使最后一名区块生产者(BP)也会是可靠的。或许更吸引人的结果之一是真正的基于市场的利率和收益率曲线的形成机制。小利益相关方可以通过参与长期质押池获得额外的影响力和更高的收益。

Exchanges would be unable to vote with user tokens because most of the control is tied up in long-term staking contracts. With one token one vote model and pay proportional to votes it would end the situation of two producers are operated by one individual. With only staked tokens voting we assure that everyone seeking to be a producer has skin in the game and that even the lowest producer slot is likely to be reliable. Perhaps one of the more fascinating outcomes is the discovery of a true market-based interest rate and yield curve. Smaller stakeholders can gain extra influence and higher yields by participating in the long-term staking pools.

资源交易所(REX)将定义最短期限(3天)的质押池收益率,REX中的通证将不再拥有投票权。那些寻求收益的人应该转移到质押池。

The REX will define the yield on the shortest term (3-day) staking pool and tokens in the REX would no longer having voting rights. Those seeking yield should move to the staking pools instead.

本提案中的所有内容都是供社区考虑的,或许是许多可行的解决方案之一。

Everything in this proposal is for community consideration and may be one of many viable solutions.

免责声明:这篇文章中的一切都是我的意见,而不是我的雇主(Block.one)的意见。不要假设本帖子中的任何内容会被任何区块链实现或采用。我没有考虑该提案的任何法律或税务后果,所以请在采用前咨询相关顾问。

Disclaimer: Everything in this post is my opinion and not that of my employer. Do not assume anything in this post will be implemented or adopted by any blockchain. I have not considered any legal or tax consequences of the proposed design, so please consult relevant advisors before moving forward.

注释:

  1. 正常的回购协议是指卖方以一定规模的资产作为抵押融入资金,并承诺在日后再购回所抵押资产的交易行为。这里的免信任的回购协议,则可以理解为不需要抵押资产就可以融入资金(EOS),并在日后把本金(EOS)和利息(投票返利)返给买方(持币人)的行为。
  2. skin in the game 据说是巴菲特首先提出来的,原指公司高层管理层自掏腰包买下公司股票的情况,以确保公司由利害与共的人来管理。后来纳西姆·尼古拉斯·塔勒布(著有《随机漫步的傻瓜》、《黑天鹅》、《反脆弱》等书),出了一本书,就叫做《skin in the game》,有人翻译成《入局——生活中隐藏的不对称性》。
  3. 可以理解为,质押池内部的Token等于股票,相当于该网络管理层skin in the game。股票的锁定期越长,投票权重越大。
  4. 三个月按90天计算,释放100%,则每1天释放1.11%,每7天合计释放7.78%;10年共520周,释放100%,每周释放0.1923%。
  5. 在这个维度上,6个质押池等价于6个不同期限的债券,即EOS网络上3个月、6个月、12个月、2年、5年和10年债券,债券利率由网络内部市场决定,成为该网络的无风险收益率,最终应该能形成类似于国债的利率期限结构。
  6. 举例:一年共525,600分钟,每分钟每个质押池释放9.5129个EOS。每分钟利息为(Sn为第n个质押池):

I=n=16(9.5129×userstokensinSntotalamountoftokeninSn)I=\sum_{n=1}^{6}(9.5129\times\frac{user's\quad tokens\quad in\quad S_n }{total\quad amount\quad of\quad token\quad in\quad S_n})

  1. 女巫攻击指个人试图通过创建多个帐户身份,多个节点或电脑坐标从而控制网络,可以参考币安学院:女巫攻击

本文发布于瞬matataki 未经授权禁止转载

免责声明:本文由用户「Ponge」上传发布,内容为作者独立观点。不代表瞬Matataki立场,不构成投资建议,请谨慎对待。

分享
推荐
不推荐
0/500
5积分/条

评论 0

notContent

暂无内容